Diplomatic Episodes.From Hiroshima & Nagasaki to the START Talks
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Diplomatic Episodes.From Hiroshima & Nagasaki to the START Talks
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NSC-686Following the Soviet's successful nuclear test on August 29, 1949, Truman ordered a review of U.S. foreign policy and possible strategies to combat a now nuclear USSR. Nitze became the director of Policy Planning on January 1, 1950, and therefore in charge of the joint State and Defense department committee to review U.S. national security. As director of the Policy Planning Staff, Nitze’s emphasized the importance of understanding the Soviets, in order to predict their actions. His research in preparation for this report focused on ‘The Kremlin design,’ which was ultimate Soviet world domination, beginning on the Eurasian landmass and with the U.S. as its final target.[4] The USSR committed itself to undermine the U.S. by any means, not just militarily.[5] Because Nitze believed the USSR would undertake actions other than purely military, the NSC-68 argued for ‘total diplomacy’ policy that would extend containment policies in Western Europe and East Asia, increase espionage, and above all increase the defense budget. On April 7, 1950, Nitze presented NSC-68 to the President; however, it was shelved until the outbreak of the Korean war, underscored his pessimistic tone.
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“In part we relied on United States monopoly of atomic weapons. We knew that our stockpile was small, and many of the military leaders doubted that it could prove decisive if war with the Soviet Union were to occur. But still the atomic bomb was an important weapon which the Soviet Union did not have…Wishful thinking and a tendency to underestimate Soviet capabilities caused some to believe it would last longer than it did.”-Nitze [6] |
Nitze's Notes During the 1962 Cuban Missile CrisisCourtesy Of Nicolas Thompson [7]
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Prior to Kennedy’s election, Nitze served as a part of his academic advisory group, and therefore was rewarded with the role of Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs. During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Nitze was a member of ExCOMM, which advised the President in their recommendations to proceed. One of three ‘hawks’, Nitze promoted the air strike strategy against the Cubans, while the Doves favored a less aggressive approach in a naval blockade. [8] Nitze believed that the Soviets would not respond due to U.S. nuclear superiority in the region, but ultimately Kennedy went with the ‘quarantine’ strategy, which was successful. In terms of nuclear security, Nitze states “one of the problems was the degree to which it was possible to achieve a true counterforce capability as opposed to the achievement merely of a secure second strike capability...[Because] “To win a war it would be necessary to have a counterforce capability.” [9] As seen in the beginnings of nuclear arms control with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, which Nitze supported.
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“I believed in arms control but not disarmament”-Nitze [10]. |
First vs. Second Strike Capability“If an actor has a strong first-strike capability but a weak second-strike capability, it matters who strikes first. But if both sides have low first-strike capability, but strong second-strike capability, there is little to no advantage to instigate a war and is more stable" [12]. |
What is an ABM & How Does it Work?Ballistic Missile Defense via Nuclear Threat Initiative
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SALT IUnder Nixon, Nitze continued his work in securing an ABM agreement and became a defense representative in the first SALT delegation. Nitze planned to constrain the Soviets ICBMs in exchange for the constraint of U.S. ABMs, because both increased one’s first-strike capacity. Nitze spent two and a half years in negotiations, travelling between Helsinki and Vienna; however, at the pinnacle event of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, the SALT planners were essentially side-lined. [13] This cause great resentment in Nitze and he resigned prior to the SALT II talks began.
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SALT IIAfter the Nitze's perceived slight from SALT I, Nitze became a harsh critic of SALT II. On July 12, 1979, Nitze appeared before the Senate Foreign relations committee where he harshly criticized SALT II and claimed that it was less favorable to the U.S., because the limits where so high it would be ineffective. [14] He also utilized a variety of platforms to lobby against the administration's choices. He participated in the 'Team B's critic of Soviet capabilities. In March 1979, Nitze also co-founded the Committee on the Present Danger, whose membership included Ronald Reagan.
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